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Making sense of monkey business: Re-examining tests of animal rationality

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Since there is only a single choice in these environments, there is no di erence between examining a distribution of choices or a single choice.

While the above conceptual distinctions are important for interpretation, this paper

$$B(p) = x 2 R_{+}^{2} j p_{1}x_{1} + p_{2}x_{2} 1 :$$

In Figure 1, the set is represented by the budget line (i.e., the set of bundles $(x_1; x_2)$ for which the expenditure $p_1x_1 + p_2x_2$ is equal to 1) and all the points below it. Throughout the paper, we assume the two budget lines under consideration intersect.




Figure 1: Two overlapping budget sets with two consumption goods x_1 and x_2 . The consumption goods for animals are often food (e.g. apples and grapes, water and avored water, etc.). The prices (p^1 and p^2) de ne a trade-o rate between two goods. Choices made on each budget line are in black and the proportion each bundle is chosen is next to it.

Unlike human experiments which describe the task to the subject, nonhuman animals cannot have the task explained to them. This has led researchers to have nonhuman animals make choices from a given budget several times. For example, a nonhuman animal may be asked to trade tokens for apples and grapes several times until the choices of the animal do not vary too much. While this is an ex-ante sensible thing to do, it also introduces the conceptual problem of trying to discern whether an individual has a preference over the distribution of their choices.

We denote the primitive dataset of choices in the two budgets by $D = (p^1; x^{1;n}) \frac{N_1}{n=1} [p^2; x^{2;m}] \frac{N_2}{m=1}$. Here p^1 is the vector of normalized prices from the rst budget environment. The bundle p^1 is interpreted as the p^1 is interpreted as the p^1 . The choices made from the second budget (under prices p^2) are indexed by p^1 . The primitive dataset also admits a distributional dataset p^2 are indexed by p^3 . The primitive dataset also admits a distributional dataset p^2 where p^3 is the sample distribution of all choices from the rst budget set. For example, given the rst budget with the price p^2

3 Models of rationality

This section de nes the three relevant models of rationality.

3.1 Standard deterministic utility maximization

Utility maximization supposes that an individual makes choices that maximize some locally nonsatiated utility function de ned by $u:R_+^2$! R over the linear budget constraint. A utility function is de ned as
locally nonsatiated when there is always a better bundle \nearby."

4 Thus, we assume that the choice of bundles is generated by

This model does not involve any distribution of choices and thus we work directly with the primitive dataset D. For this model, one could only see two distinct bundles such as $x^{1;1}$ 6 $x^{1;2}$ chosen from the same budget when the utility from the rst bundle equals the

3.2 Average rationality

Average rationality is essentially deterministic utility rationalization over the average bundle chosen. This is the type of rationality that has been examined in Kagel et al. (1975), Battalio et al. (1981), Kagel et al. (1981), Battalio et al. (1985), Kagel et al. (1995), and Chen et al. (2006). Since the average is a property of the distribution of choices, we consider a model where an individual can have a preference for randomization. In

3.3 Random utility

We now de ne the random utility maximization following (1960),Block and Marschak (2005), Hoderlein and Stoye McFadden and Richter (1990), McFadden (2015), and Kitamura and Stoye (2018). The idea behind random utility models is that an individual's choices might be governed by a distribution over di erent preferences. For example, one could interpret these preferences as di erent moods. U be the space of strictly To represent random utility models mathematically, let ษ: R₊²! R. A random utility model quasiconcave locally nonsatiated utility functions generates choices in the following manner. First, there is a probability measure over the space of functions U such that the distribution of choices 2 satis es (O) = $u 2 U : argmax _{x2R_{+}^{2}jp_{1}x_{1}+p_{2}x_{2}-1} u(x) 2 O$ (1) O \mathbb{R}^2_+ . The argmax set is a singleton since for any measurable set U consists of strictly quasiconcave functions. In other words, the probability of choosing a bundle in the set 0 is equal to the probability of drawing a utility function that is maximized over the budget at some point in the set O. The method to test random utility models signi cantly di ers from the deterministic utility model and average rationality. The paper of **Hoderlein and Stoye** (2015) shows that for the random utility model, one only needs to check conditions on the probabilities of making choices in certain regions. The regions of choice are shown in Figure 2. Here R^{1j1} is the region on the rst budget line that lies above the second budget line in Figure 2. R^{rjt} as the r-th region of the t-th budget as de ned in Figure 2. More generally, we refer to Since we assume that preferences are locally nonsatiated, the only relevant regions are on the budget lines.

 $\overrightarrow{\mathsf{x}}_1$

Hoderlein and Stoye (2015) show that random utility models can be checked by examining choice probabilities in these regions with a distributional data set D_D . A similar result holds for higher dimensional consumption with multiple budgets as shown in Kitamura and Stoye (2018). The condition essentially requires that there cannot be a large proportion of violations of deterministic rationality. For an appropriately measurable set S_+ and the probability measure S_+ we let S_+ we let S_+ be the probability a choice is in the set S_+ . We record the result from S_+ Hoderlein and Stoye (2015) below.

Proposition 3. The distributional dataset $D_D = (p^1; ^1); (p^2; ^2)$ is consistent with a random utility model if and only if $^1(R^{1j1})$ $^2(R^{1j2})$ and $^1(R^{3j1}) = ^2(R^{3j2})$.

4 Statistical testing of average rationality

The method of inference we present is designed for application to the common datasets in nonhuman animal experiments mentioned throughout. Thus, we have two goods and two budget sets. ⁶ This empirical setting has several features that simplify statistical testing relative to a more general setup. First, prices and income are known exactly, so they do not need to be estimated. Second, there are several realized choices from each budget, which allows us to use the central limit theorem to justify a normal approximation of the means of the sampled distributions. Third, because we have two budgets, there is a

The alternative is the same as the statement in Proposition

2 and written as

$$H_a: p^1 \quad E[X^{2;m}] \qquad 1 \quad \text{ and } \\ p^2 \quad E[X^{1;n}] \qquad 1 \quad \text{ with one inequality strict.}$$

Recall that in the application, prices and income are measured without error, so we use lower case letters to indicate that they are nonrandom.

Thus, on the event

$$p_1 \overline{X}^2 1 ^{-1}$$

or equivalently

$$p_1 \ \overline{X}^2 + ^2O^0 \overline{1}$$
 1;

we have strong evidence against

$$p^1 E[X^{2;m}]$$
 1:

A similar argument holds when testing the other inequality. Thus, when the test function is 1, we have strong evidence againstoth inequalities

$$p^1 E[X^{2;m}]$$
 1 and $p^2 E[X^{1;n}]$ 1;

i.e., strong evidence agains \mathbb{H}_0 . The choice of \mathbb{G}_1 —comes from the fact that we have to reject two inequalities. In more detail, this threshold is motivated by

Prob p¹ E[X^{2;m}] p¹
$$\overline{X}^2 + ^2 o^{\frac{1c}{1}}$$

$$c_{0.5} = 0$$
.

One may not not the failure to reject an interesting way to di erentiate between datasets. We suggest one way to di erentiate between datasets in the spirit of the Afriat e ciency index (Afriat , 1973). Instead, one can cona8Glute the least nominal size under which the null is rejected. To do this, one can cona8Glute the largest of under which the test rejects the data and then not the corresponding . The construction of is related to a p-value but is distinct because there are con gurations consistent with the null hyothesis in which rejection probabilities are not asymptotically equal to nominal size .

5 Application to Chen et al. (2006)

We apply the above procedure to the data on choices by caluchin monkeys that was previously analyzed in Chen et al. (2006). We examine whether the caluchin monkeys are rational according to deterministic utility maximization, average rationality, and random utility models. Thus, we check the conditions of the earlier proositions.

The exleriment waserformed on three di erent caluchin monkeys. We refer to the three subjects under their abbreviations: AG, FL, and NN. The consumption bundles consisted of two goods: slices of apples and gelatin cubes or grapes (depending on the subject). In the exleriment, caluchin monkeys traded tokens for food items under two di erent exchange rate regimes. In the rst regime, one token could be exchanged for one slice of apple or one gelatin cube/grape. In the second regime, two slices of apple could be exchanged for one gelatin cube/grape. Per each subject, the data generated in the exleriment consisted of multiple choices from the two budget sets. For additional information on the exleriment, we refer the reader to Chen et al. (2006).

The details and results of the test are contained in Table 1. We note that two of the three subjects from Chen et al. (2006) refute utility maximization, while all three subjects could be described by a random utility model and average rationality. We note that all monkeys satisfy average rationality so the statistical test prolosed earlier does not reject for any < 0:75. To try to better discern between the di erent datasets, we also report the least cona8Glu1

	Subject				
	AG	FL	NN		
	Budget 1				
p ¹	(1 =12; 1=12)	(1 =12;1=12)	(1 =12;1=12)		
N_1	12	11	6		
X ¹	(6:08; 5:92)	(5:64; 6:36)	(5; 7)		
	Budget 2				
p^2	(1 =18 ; 1=9)	(1 =20;1=10)	(1 =20;1=10)		
N_2	22	14	10		
X ²	(9; 4:5)	(13 :86; 3:07)	(12 :8; 3:6)		
Deterministic	No	No	Yes		
Random utility	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Λ	W				

Average choice Yes

No

et al. (1981), Kagel et al. (1981), Battalio et al. (1985), and Kagel et al. (1995) evaluating average rationality can also be interpreted as evidence for a preference over distributions.

This complements an approach in Natenzon (2019) that studies stochastic choice for nonhuman subjects without studying an explicit preference over distributions.

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